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Punitive damages for breach of contract: what’s so special 
about contract claims?
It might seem presumptuous for an English lawyer to talk to a Texas audience on the 
subject of punitive damages for breach of contract. The US literature is immense and 
has addressed the problem from almost every imaginable perspective. By contrast, 
there  are  no  cases  in  England,  and  only  a  few  elsewhere  in  the  British 
Commonwealth, which have granted such relief at all. 
On the other hand, this position does in practice provide the advantage of 
starting from a clean slate, without some of the intellectual baggage carried by the 
American  case-law  and  commentary.  Furthermore,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
comparative law the subject is very much a live one. It is true that civil lawyers in 
general 1 are still a long way away from accepting the punitive principle in contract 
damages, or indeed at all 2. But there are nevertheless civil law jurisdictions that do 
allow punitive damages  3. Furthermore, even among those that do not  − at least in 
theory − the flexibility of damages for non-pecuniary loss may well let in a more or 
less official practice of damages aimed at deterrence as well as compensation proper 
4. Added to this, the French institution of the astreinte, a kind of private fine against 
those who disobey court orders to fulfill their obligations  5, has obvious affinities 
with punitive damages. 
As for England, which used to be one of the most restrictive common law 
jurisdictions, the House of Lords has recently liberalized the rules so as to leave the 
question more open. Prior to  2002 punitive awards in England were deliberately 
marginalized; as a result of decisions in 1963 6 and 1971 7 (rightly described by one 
commentator as an “unfortunate experiment” 8) they were limited to a few listed torts 
9. Furthermore, even within these they were restricted to cases where the tort either 
1 Including Louisianians, whose state law prohibits punitives except when specifically allowed by 
statute: Billiot v. British Petroleum Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604, 612 (1994).
2 Stoll, 11 Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, §§ 104 et seq. France: Viney & Jourdain, Les Effets de 
la Responsabilité (2d ed), §§ 4-6. For German law, see BGB, §§ 249-252, exhaustively defining 
damages in compensatory terms; also Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law - 
Tendencies Toward Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 105 
(2003). The theoretical objection to punitives in German law has been taken very seriously. It was held 
in 1992 to preclude enforcement of even foreign punitive awards on public policy grounds: see BGHZ 
118, 312. 
3 Professor Gotanda cites Brazil, Israel, Norway, the Philippines, and Poland (Gotanda, Punitive 
Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 391, 395) (though Israel is only 
arguably a civil law jurisdiction). The European Court of Justice has also said that damages for sex 
discrimination at work contrary to EU law must be sufficient not only to compensate but also to deter, 
which seems to mandate a punitive element in at least some cases: von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 453-454. 
4 As where the German Supreme Court in 1961 condoned a deterrent element in damages for breach of 
privacy: see the decision at BGHZ 35, 363, cited in Behr, supra, at 133.
5 Where the court order to perform is disobeyed the court has the power to set a fine (normally a daily 
or weekly one) as long as the disobedience continues, payable to the plaintiff. The subject is usefully 
summarized in Viney & Jourdain, Les Effets de la Responsabilité (2d ed), § 6.5
6 Rookes v Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129.
7 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] A.C. 1027.
8 See Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 La. L. Rev. 781, 787 (1996). 
9 Which, significantly, did not include negligence in any form: AB v South West Water Services Ltd 
[1993] Q.B. 507.
was committed by a government entity or employee, or – in the case of a private 
wrongdoer – was motivated by a calculation that the tort would result in a gain to the 
defendant  exceeding  any  tort  damages  he  might  have  to  pay  10.  This  obviously 
excluded punitive damages  en bloc  from the whole field of contract. However, in 
Kuddus v Leicestershire Chief Constable 11 the House of Lords removed the first 
restriction. Furthermore, at least one member of the House cast considerable doubt 
on the second, on the understandable basis that the limitation contained in it served 
no discernible  purpose except  as an arbitrary way of showing disapproval of the 
whole idea of punitive damages  12.  Assuming that his view is  followed (and this 
seems a racing certainty in the near future, at least if the matter reaches the House of 
Lords again), it follows that on principle there is now no absolute bar on punitive 
damages  for  breach  of  contract  in  private  law  13.  Elsewhere  in  the  British 
Commonwealth the extremely constricting English were never applied 14, and hence 
the ground was more fertile to start with as regards contract actions. This has not 
gone unnoticed. While Australia has thus far refused to extend punitive damages 
outside tort cases 15, the New Zealand High Court has been prepared to accept for the 
sake of argument that they can be awarded for breach of contract 16, and in 2003 the 
Canadian Supreme Court explicitly, if controversially, gave punitive damages on a 
contract theory in a first-party insurance bad faith case 17. Furthermore, although this 
is not strictly relevant to the breach of contract issue, it is worth noting that Canada 
and New Zealand, like many US jurisdictions 18, have now firmly come down on the 
side of allowing punitive awards for other nontortious wrongs, such as breach of 
fiduciary duty 19.
The  thrust  of  this  paper  can  be  straightforwardly  summarized  in  two 
propositions. 
10 For the history see generally Tettenborn, Punitive Damages − A View from England, 41 San Diego L. 
Rev. 1551, 1552 et seq (2004). 
11 [2002] 2 A.C. 122.
12 See [2002] 2 A.C. 122, 145 (Lord Nicholls).
13 Though perhaps not short of the House of Lords: see the comments in Travelers Casualty & Surety 
Co of Europe Ltd v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (UK) Ltd  [2004] EWHC 1704 (Comm), [2004] 
Lloyd's Rep IR 846 at [76]. In one case, Newcastle upon Tyne CC v Allan [2005] I.C.R. 1170 they were 
refused in a statutory contract claim: but since the statute concerned pretty clearly was intended to 
exclude any non-pecuniary loss, this is arguably a special case.
14 See Vorvis v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (1989) 58 D.L.R.  (4th) 193 (Canada); Uren 
v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118 (affirmed in the Privy Council, [1969] 1 A.C. 
590) (Australia); Taylor v. Beere [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 81 (New Zealand). The Republic of Ireland equally 
retained an expansive approach: Conway v. Irish National Teachers' Organisation [1991] 2 I.R. 305 
(constitutional tort).
15 See Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1, 6-7; Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v  
Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 F.C.R. 157 at [142]-[143], [164]; and more recently Harris v 
Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2002) 44 A.C.S.R. 390 (declining to extend punitive awards despite 
developments elsewhere in the Commonwealth).
16 Gunton v Aviation Classics Ltd [2004] 3 N.Z.L.R. 836 (conduct by seller of unairworthy helicopter 
highly blameworthy, but not quite egregious enough for a punitive award). An award had actually been 
made in Tak and Co Inc v AEL Corporation Ltd (1995) 5 NZBLC 103, the correctness of which was 
left open in Gunton.
17 Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595: criticized in Swan,  Punitive Damages for Breach 
of Contract: A Remedy in Search of a Justification, 29 Queen's L.J. 596 (2004). 
18 See, e.g., the decisions in Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (1985) and Airlines 
Reporting Corp’n. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579 (1989) (both applying NY law); and 
generally Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal 
Change, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 207, 226-29 (1977).
19 Canada: Norberg v. Wynrib [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226. New Zealand: Aquaculture Corp’n v New Zealand 
Green Mussel Co Ltd [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 299.
(1) If we accept the principle of punitive damages in tort cases, their appropriateness 
in at least some suits for breach of contract cannot seriously be questioned. The 
issue is not so much whether punitive awards should be available for breach of 
contract, but when. 
(2) Subject to one possible exception, there is no need for specific restrictions on 
their  availability  in  breach  of  contract  cases.  It  is  true  that  there  may  be  a 
commercial necessity to prevent every breach of contract suit from becoming a 
potential  punitive  damages  claim:  but  this,  I  suggest,  can  be  perfectly  well 
satisfied by applying principles similar to those that already govern damages in 
torts. 
Admittedly, the assumption in (1) is a big one, even though all but some five state 
jurisdictions  accept  it  20.  There  are  strong  arguments  against  punitive  damages 
anywhere as a matter of principle. It can, for instance, be argued that they confuse 
the functions of criminal and civil law and thereby violate due process in so far as 
they punish the defendant without providing criminal safeguards 21: that they reward 
handsomely the undeserving plaintiff 22: that they do not in fact deter defendants, or 
if they do they do it in an inefficient way: that they create unacceptable social costs, 
as by bankrupting otherwise economically viable defendants 23: and so on 24. But this 
article  is  not  the  place  to  canvass  these  arguments.  I  will  therefore  assume  the 
propriety of punitive awards as a matter of principle and concentrate on the specific 
point of whether,  and if  so when, their  award is ever justifiable  in a contractual 
setting. 
I. The point of principle: are punitive damages ever justified in contract suits?
The American authority on whether a contract claimant can obtain punitive damages, 
and if so when, is substantial; it therefore forms an obvious starting-point for any 
discussion of the subject. But, if one may say so, it is not a very helpful one. To say 
the cases do not provide a uniform or clear rule is an understatement. It is true that 
most state courts pay at least lip-service to the proposition that prima facie there can 
be  no punitive award for  a  breach of  contract  25.  But  then add to  this  continual 
20 The exceptions being the civilian Louisiana (see above) and Nebraska, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire and Washington, all of which bar such damages as a common-law remedy. See Rustad & 
Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social 
Theory, 68 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 66 (2002).
21 Cf Owen, Punitive damages awards in product liability litigation: strong medicine or poison pill? 39 
Vill. L. Rev. 363, 364 (1994). The point troubled Rehnquist J in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) 
and also Lord Devlin in the English decision in Rookes v Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1230.
22 See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967); also Lord Devlin 
in Rookes v Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1230 (“I do not care for the idea that … an aggrieved party 
should be able to inflict for his own benefit punishment by a method which denies to the offender the 
protection of the criminal law.”) (italics added). The point is admittedly stronger in England than in the 
US, since in the US punitives can serve as a surrogate for recovery of attorney’s fees, whereas in 
England the plaintiff gets these anyway as a matter of course.
23 See Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and 
Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L.J. 285 (1998).
24 See e.g. Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 
1117 (1984). The arguments are well summarized in Beever, The Structure of Aggravated and 
Exemplary Damages, 23 Oxford J. Leg. St. 87 (2003).
25 Farnsworth, Contracts, § 12.3, at 157 (3d ed. 1999) ("Punitive damages should not be awarded for 
breach of contract because they will encourage performance when breach would be socially more 
disagreement about whether there can be exceptions (and if so, whether they apply to 
breaches of all contracts or only some kinds of contract) 26; differing classifications 
of what actually counts as a contract claim for these purposes 27; a collection of more 
or  less  explicit  state  statutes  on  the  matter  28 to  be followed (or,  if  the  court  is 
sympathetic to the plaintiff, circumvented 29); and the fact that an undue proportion 
of  the authorities  concern  one  kind of  claim  − insurance  bad  faith  − which  can 
amount to the legal tail wagging the juristic dog 30; and the difficulties become clear. 
In practice, however, some four broad trends are discernible 31. 
First, a good many states 32 take the purist or traditional line. Distinguishing 
sharply tort and contract liability, they simply deny punitive damages in the latter, 
period. Damages of this sort are thus limited to cases where the plaintiff can prove 
some traditional independent tort, such as fraud, in addition to the breach of contract 
33. 
Secondly, a few jurisdictions similarly exclude punitive breach of contract 
liability on principle, but then recharacterize certain contract claims  − notably the 
duty of good faith implicit in most contractual obligations − as torts, which can then 
be made susceptible to a punitive award 34.
Thirdly,  yet  others  achieve  much  the  same  result  by  allowing  punitive 
damage claims outside the tort arena, but strictly limiting them to certain types of 
contract.  Common candidates  are  insurance contracts,  those  involving vulnerable 
groups or “special relationships,” and those (for example, partnership) with fiduciary 
overtones 35. 
Lastly,  a small  number of states  36 accept punitive damages as a possible 
remedy  in  contracts  generally,  and  leave  the  limitations  on  such  damages  to  be 
answered  –  as  they  are  in  torts  –  not  by  reference  to  any  a priori rule,  but  by 
desirable.")
26 For a summary of the various positions, see Dodge, The case for punitive damages in contracts, 48 
Duke L.J. 629, 637 (1999). 
27 Powers, The availability of tort remedies for breach of contract: border wars, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1209 
(1994). 
28 E.g. Cal. Civ. Code 3294(a); Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-220(2)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.005(1). All 
specifically prohibit punitive contract damages, though Montana has an exception for product liability 
and bad faith nonpayment (aimed, no doubt, at insurers). 
29 As in (to take one example) the reclassification of insurance bad faith as a tort to get round a 
restrictive Montana statute: Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970, 977 (1982).
30 The literature is large. See, e.g., Ashley, Bad Faith Liability, § 2.05 (1987); Graves, Bad-Faith 
Denial Of Insurance Claims, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 395, 402 (1990). For a strong criticism, see Gergen, 
Symposium on the law of bad faith in contract and insurance: I. The availability of tort remedies for 
breach of contract: A cautionary tale about contractual good faith in Texas, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1235 
(1994).
31 See generally Dodge, The case for punitive damages in contracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629, 644 et seq 
(1999).
32 Listed in Dodge, The case for punitive damages in contracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629, 644, n.87 (1999).
33 For example, where a seller has not only supplied bad goods but in addition fraudulently mis-
certified them to the buyer, giving rise to rortious liability for fraud: cf the recent California decision in 
Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979; 102 P.3d 268 (2004).
34 Notably Vermont and Hawaii: Dodge, The case for punitive damages in contracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629, 
648-649 (1999). California takes a similar view: see e.g. Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 14 Cal. App. 
4th 70; 17 Cal. Rptr. 2D 649 (1993). The Canadian courts have laid themselves open to suspicion of 
doing the same thing: e.g., Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care (2002) 215 D.L.R. (4th) 31 
(wrongful termination: tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress superadded to justify 
punitive award).
35 Dodge, The case for punitive damages in contracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629, 646. The insurance exception 
can on occasion be statutory, as in (e.g.) Pennsylvania: see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371.
36 Notably Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico and South Carolina: Dodge, The case for punitive damages 
in contracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629, 649.
reference to specific criteria, such as the blameworthiness of the breach, the need for 
commercial certainty, and so on 37. 
Where  does  all  this  leave  us?  In  discussing  whether  there  is  ever  a 
justification for giving punitive damages in contract cases, we can, I suggest, start 
with two propositions. 
The first is that torts and breaches of contract are analytically similar. Both 
are civil wrongs requiring the defendant to pay damages for infringing the plaintiff’s 
rights, the only difference being the source of those rights. Now, if this is so, it is 
suggested that,  prima facie, horizontal equity between plaintiffs must demand that 
they be treated in the same way as regards the rules relating to the kinds of damages 
that can be awarded 38. Only if we can find some relevant difference in kind between 
the  two  types  of  damages  claim  − contract  and  tort,  duties  accepted  and duties 
imposed  − can we rationally justify allowing punitive awards in one but entirely 
disallowing them in the other. This is a point I return to later.
The second is that the question of punitive damages for breach of contract 
must  be  viewed  as  one  of  principle,  rather  than  as  an  arbitrary  exercise  in 
classification. A given claim arising from breach of contract either should, or should 
not, be capable of giving rise to a penal award. In particular, this means that the 
second approach outlined above – arbitrarily moving some kinds of claim from the 
contracts course to the torts course – is unacceptable. Take a case where a defendant 
has clearly broken his contract willfully, outrageously and in bad faith − for example, 
a typical insurance bad faith claim. It solves no problems to reclassify the matter as a 
tort and then license a jury to mulct the defendant in punitive damages on that basis 
alone 39. Whatever label a court chooses to attach to the claim, the complaint remains 
essentially one that the defendant has not done what he contracted to do, and the 
issue remains whether supracompensatory damages should be available. To create an 
artificial tort to cover the situation is simply an exercise in legal legerdemain, aimed 
at hiding a determination that breaches of contract of this sort ought to give rise to 
penal damages for some other unspecified reason, or possibly at  circumventing a 
statutory prohibition of such damages in contract cases. If that determination falls to 
be made, it should be done openly on the basis of the policy factors involved.
Having cleared the air a little, is there then a relevant distinction of principle 
between tort and contract claims sufficient to justify treating the latter differently 
merely because they are contract claims? I suggest that there is not.
The  first,  and  most  important,  point  in  this  connection  is  based  on 
consistency.  Take  some  stock  tort  cases  where  awards  of  punitive  damages  are 
commonplace. A corporation peddles pills (or cars, or asbestos, or any number of 
other things that go to increase the hazards of twenty-first century life) that it knows 
to be potentially deadly; a rapacious lessor invades his tenant’s home without color 
of right and throws her and her belongings in the street; an auto dealership makes a 
habit  of deceiving consumers into buying substandard vehicles; and so on.  Penal 
awards in cases such as these are routinely, and plausibly, defended on a number of 
37 See generally Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 361 S.C. 156; 604 S.E.2d 385 (2004). 
38 A point rightly made in Bridgeman, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive 
Damages? 56 Vand. L. Rev. 237 (2003). Cf Mather, Searching for the moral foundations of contract  
law, 47 Am. J. Jurispr. 71 (2002), arguing on this basis for a general punitive liability for all deliberate 
breaches. Note, however, that this seems a somewhat jejune approach, and this article does not go that 
far.
39 See Powers, Symposium on the law of bad faith in contract and insurance: I. The availability of tort  
remedies for breach of contract: border wars, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1209 (1994), 1230 n 71. This point has 
not gone unnoticed by some more sensible courts: see, e.g., Tobin v Ruman, 819 N.E.2d 78, 86 (2004) 
(no claim for punitives for failure to pay employee agreed compensation: allegation of fraud merely 
“repackaged version of his breach of contract claim”). 
grounds.  These  include,  among  others,  deterrence  40;  retribution  41;  the  need  to 
express  curial  disapproval  and  educate  the  public  in  the  difference  between 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior  42; the inadequacy of compensatory damages 
in practice, and the desirability of funding the plaintiff’s attorney fees to ensure she 
is  not  out of pocket  43;  and no doubt  others.  But,  whatever the validity of these 
arguments, it is difficult to see why they should be regarded as peculiar to torts. On 
the contrary; very similar problems arise in contract suits; and I would suggest that 
the  same  logic  is  just  as  applicable  there,  assuming  the  breach  is  sufficiently 
outrageous and deserving of punishment 44. Apart from the obvious example of the 
insurer stonewalling a known good claim in the hope that an impecunious client will 
give up in despair and go away, there are numerous other similar cases. Thus at one 
time or another particular courts have been prepared to countenance punitive awards 
against the home lessor who purposely omits to repair the property let, endangering 
the safety of the tenant (whom he dislikes and wishes to persuade to move anyway) 
45;  the  contractor  who  deliberately  retains  payments  due  a  cash-strapped 
subcontractor in order to force her to compromise a claim she has against him at a 
fraction of its value 46; the business seller who blatantly and cynically breaks a non-
competition  covenant,  causing  the  bankruptcy  of  the  buyer  47;  the  lawyer  who 
knowingly allows a conflict of interest to prevent his representing his client properly 
48; and so on. The arguments in favor of deterring, or disapproving, conduct of this 
sort seem, at least at first sight, just as strong as those applying in the tort examples 
already mentioned.
And so, I suggest, with other arguments in favor of punitive awards, such as 
efficiency. It is difficult to deny  that punitive damages are efficient in some tort 
cases 49: in other words, there are at least some situations in which the possibility of a 
supracompensatory award will cause precautions to be taken whose costs are less 
40 See generally Restatement 2d of Torts, § 908(1); Galligan, Augmented Awards: The Efficient  
Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 La. L. Rev. 3, 6-14 (1990) (arguing that this is their sole legitimate 
aim). See too Owen, Punitive damages awards in product liability litigation: strong medicine or 
poison pill? A punitive damages overview: functions, problems and reform, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 363, 376-
377 (1994).
41 Accepted as a possible aim, together with deterrence, in Galanter & Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive 
Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1432-40, 1447-51 (1993); see too Owen, 
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1279 (1976).
42 Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1281 (1976); 
Owen, Punitive damages awards in product liability litigation, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 363, 374-375 (1994).
43 See Owen, Punitive damages awards in product liability litigation, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 363, 378 (1994) 
(and cf the Connecticut decision in Vogel v Sylvester, 174 A.2d 122 (1961)). This argument is urged 
specifically in connection with contract claims in Sebert, Punitive and nonpecuniary damages in 
actions based upon contract: toward achieving the objective of full compensation, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 
1565 (1986). 
44 This is not of course to say that the criteria for an award of punitives should necessarily be the same: 
as we argue below, there may just be reasons for being more skeptical of punitive claims in contract 
than in tort. My argument is more limited: it is simply that there is no ground for excluding punitives as 
such in cases of breach of contract.
45 E.g., Hilder v. St. Peter  144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984); Young v. Scott, 108 Idaho 506, 700 P.2d 
128 (1985) (both cases where punitives were awarded).
46 E.g., Southern School Bldg., Inc. v. Loew Elec., Inc., 407 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. 1980).
47 Compare Budget Rent-A-Car of Missouri, Inc. v. B & G Rent-A-Car, Inc., 619 S.W.2d 832, 838 (Mo. 
1981); Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682 P.2d 1282 (1984).
48 Wilson v. Vanden Berg, 687 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa, 2004). See too the broker’s churning case of Nunes 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 609 F. Supp. 1055 (D.C. Md. 1985) (where punitive 
damages would have been available had plaintiff proved malice). 
49 Though some have still done so: see, e.g., Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against  
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L.J. 285 (1998).
than the costs that would have been incurred had the wrongful conduct taken place 50. 
But then exactly the same argument applies in contract cases: whatever the position 
in contract as a whole, there are at least some breaches whose costs exceed their 
possible  benefits  to  either  party,  and  which  are  thus  capable  of  being  optimally 
prevented by the possibility of a penal award  51. Similarly, much the same can be 
said of other, more tendentious and less mainstream, rationales for punitive damages, 
such as. arguments based on corrective justice 52. The validity of justifications such 
as these may be open to question: but if one does accept them, there seems no  a 
priori reason for arbitrarily limiting their application to noncontract situations 53.
Apart from consistency, the second reason for skepticism about any blanket 
exclusion of punitives from the contractual sphere is the sheer width of the spectrum 
covered by breach of contract claims. Given the variety of different kinds of contract 
claim, the idea that all of them share characteristics making punitives inappropriate 
seems inherently implausible. True, in theory all contract claims are bottomed on 
non-performance  of  some  express  or  implied  promise  freely  undertaken  by  the 
defendant  rather  than  on  some  broad  need  for  protection  against  unwarranted 
invasion  of  particular  interests.  But,  as  any  contract  lawyer  can  confirm,  the 
reference to promise can be pretty remote and incidental. It is all very well to start 
from  the  contract  theorist’s  favorite  broken  agreement  to  supply  a  quantity  of 
disembodied  widgets  easily  available  in  some elastic  mythical  market  (no  doubt 
administered from some faceless skyscraper in Chicago). Here there is indeed a very 
strong case for limiting the plaintiff to compensatories 54.  However, we have to note 
the limitations of examples of this sort. As pointed out below, they represent a rather 
specialised, almost mathematical, sort of contract. It follows that reasoning which is 
appropriate to them may be more difficult to apply to other contract-breakers. The 
opportunistic  and  cynical  breaker  of  a  noncompetition  covenant,  the  seriously 
delinquent lessor, the supplier of consumer goods that he knows do not work and 
never will, and the professional guilty of outrageous malpractice, are all a long way 
from the staid commodity trader who fails to provide goods available elsewhere. In 
short, advocates of outlawing all punitive awards in contract cases have to produce 
convincing evidence that their arguments apply in all these nonstandard situations: 
and this is likely to be a tall order.
Thirdly,  the  idea  that  punitives  should  be excluded from contracts,  while 
admitted in torts, necessarily presupposes a reasonably clear line between the two. 
Unless we are pretty certain just what claims we want to exclude punitive awards 
50 Among the large literature, the efficiency argument is nicely summarized in Polinsky & Shavell, 
Punitive damages: an economic analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1998). The argument there − 
somewhat simplified − is that punitive damages should be based on computing the chances of the 
defendant escaping liability in some cases and increasing awards proportionately where he is sued to 
judgment. 
51 See, e.g., Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the Imposition 
of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 877, 879-90 
(1992); Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of  
Contract, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1443, 1448-62 (1980); Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 936-39 (1998); Curtis, Note, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith 
Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 161, 166-70 (1986). Even Posner is 
driven to accept this: Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed. 2003), p.130, a point dealt with below.
52 E.g. Mather, Searching for the moral foundations of contract law, 47 Am. J. Juris. 71 (2002); 
Bridgeman, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages? 56 Vand. L. 
Rev. 237 (2003). 
53 A point made in specific connection with corrective justice in Bridgeman, Corrective Justice in 
Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages? 56 Vand. L. Rev. 237 (2003).
54 Notably the efficiency argument that sellers should be encouraged to direct their wares to those who 
value them most and are thus prepared to pay most for them: Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th 
ed. 1998), p.142. 
from, the argument for doing so becomes distinctly shaky. In fact, however, even 
discounting cases where courts have artificially manufactured a cause of action in 
tort out of what is essentially a contract breach, this boundary is to say the least 
fuzzy. True, a simple case of nondelivery or nonacceptance in the sales context is 
contract or nothing: by contrast, a product liability suit by a worker injured by a 
lethally defective dumptruck must be tort. But other cases are not so easy. Take a 
client’s malpractice suit against her lawyer (or other professional defendant). Does 
this count as contract or tort? In America the answer as often as not depends on 
where the plaintiff  sues and what  profession is  involved  55:  in England all  client 
malpractice suits are contractual or tortious at plaintiff’s option 56: and if one ranges 
abroad to France or Germany, the theory of liability is likely to be contract alone 57. 
Similarly, if  the malpractice plaintiff  is  a nonclient,  the defendant’s  liability may 
again be contractual (depending on the generosity of the relevant jurisdiction as to 
contractual third party rights), or tortious, or both 58. Yet again, take another fruitful 
field  of  litigation:  imagine  that  a  defendant  terminates  contractual  negotiations 
pretextually and in incontrovertible bad faith,  causing the plaintiff  enormous and 
entirely foreseeable reliance losses. Assuming the defendant is liable for these losses 
at all 59, the basis of liability is by no means clear-cut 60. The US courts vary 61: it is 
possible  to find theories of recovery based on contract  62,  estoppel  63 and tort  64. 
England, though disinclined to impose liability at all, would if it gave damages limit 
the plaintiff to tort 65. Further afield, France imposes liability readily but does so in 
tort 66; by contrast Germany, while emphatically willing to make the defendant liable 
in  these  circumstances  67,  is  equally  insistent  on  characterizing  his  liability  as 
exclusively  contractual  68.  In  all  these  cases,  the  question  whether  the  claim  is 
55 Lawyers are generally liable in tort or contract alternatively: e.g. Collins v Reynard, 154 Ill 2d 48 
(1992), Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575 (1995). Other professions have evoked a mixed response. Cf 
Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross & Co.,  159 Ill. 2d 137; 636 N.E.2d 503 (accountant liable 
in tort to client); Nielsen v US Automobile Ass’n, 244 Ill App 3d 658, 612 NE 2d 526 (1993) (insurance 
agent’s liability lies in contract); Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999) (same with 
architect’s liability to client). See generally Galligan, Contortions along the boundary between 
contracts and torts, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 457, 476 (1994).
56 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 145.
57 In France because of the rule of non-cumul, presumptively barring tort liability if there is a contract 
between plaintiff and defendant: Viney, IV Traité de Droit Civil, La Responsabilité: conditions, §§ 216 
et seq.. On malpractice liability in Germany, see the accessible and readable Coester & Markesinis, 
Liability of Financial Experts in German and American Law: An Exercise in Comparative 
Methodology, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 275, 278 (2003).
58 Thus  where an attorney negligently misdrafts a will and defeats a legacy, liability is normally 
predicated on tort, as in cases such as Biakanja v Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958)). But it may just as 
plausibly be bottomed on a third-party liability in contract: see, e.g. the Oregon decision in Hale v.  
Groce, 304 Ore. 281, 744 P.2d 1289 (1987).
59 I discount here the possibility of recovery for benefits conferred, which is a different question 
essentially raising issues of restitution rather than damages.
60 Cf Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and Precontractual Liability, 12 Tul. 
Eur. & Civ. L.F. 97 (1997). 
61 See Farnsworth, Precontractual liability and preliminary agreements: fair dealing and failed 
negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1987). 
62 E.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958)
63 Exemplified by Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965).
64 Restatement 2d of Torts, §§ 525, 530 (1977).
65 The subject is nicely explored in Giliker, A Role For Tort In Pre-Contractual Negotiations? An 
Examination Of English, French, And Canadian Law (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 969.
66 See the decision of the Cour de Cassation in 7 Apr 1998 D 1999.514, note P Chauvel; also Schmidt, 
La Sanction de la Faute Précontractuelle, 73 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 46, 51(1974).
67 Cf now BGB, § 241.II, inserted in 2002.
68 An example being the judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof dated July 14, 1967 by the. See too Lake, 
Letters of Intent: A Comparative Examination Under English, U.S., French, and West German Law, 18 
tortious or nontortious is answered essentially arbitrarily: but clearly, the policy issue 
of whether punitive awards should be available on a given set of facts remains the 
same. 
Fourthly, it is worth remembering that in many, if not most, US jurisdictions 
(and  occasionally  elsewhere)  punitive  awards  can  be  had  for  certain  nontortious 
liabilities which do depend on an undertaking of responsibility, such as breach of 
fiduciary duty  69. If this is right, then unless there is some particular feature about 
contract that marks it off from other damage liabilities, once again its exclusion is 
suspicious.
So far I have argued that contract and tort are similar in a number of ways 
that suggest they ought to be treated similarly. I now turn to the possible arguments 
that there is nevertheless a relevant difference in kind between them that justifies 
putting contract damages in a category of their own 70.
One such argument  is  that  tort  claims  differ  in  an essential  respect  from 
contractual ones in that tort duties are imposed for the benefit of all, willy-nilly the 
defendant, while contractual obligations are voluntarily accepted and are particular to 
the parties concerned. Hence (the argument continues) draconian discouragement of 
breach is much more important for the former than the latter  71. But, whatever the 
instinctive attractiveness of this point, the closer we look at it the less substantial it 
becomes. Apart from the fuzziness of the contract-tort boundary itself, it is also the 
case that many  tort duties are essentially undertaken rather than imposed: notable 
examples are those torts based on misrepresentation, such as negligent misstatement 
and  (arguably)  even  fraud.  Conversely,  contractual  duties  –  especially  the  ones 
where punitive damages are an issue – are often not that different from tortious ones, 
being in substance imposed rather than undertaken. There is little to choose in terms 
of  voluntariness  between  the  (contractual)  duty  of  a  lawyer  not  to  engage  in 
malpractice and the (tortious) obligation of a drug manufacturer not to peddle toxic 
pharmaceuticals: effectively both duties are imposed on a defendant simply by virtue 
of the business he practices. Again, once we get away from the archetypal contract to 
supply a quantity of easily-available widgets, breaches of contract may well affect 
nonparties in ways we ought to notice. It  is easy to forget that it  is not only the 
immediate  parties  who  stand  to  lose  from  (for  example)  crass  professional 
malpractice by lawyers and accountants, the continued and purposeful disregard of 
duties owed to consumers or small businesses; similarly, the market as a whole has 
an interest in preventing the cynical breach of noncompetition contracts by business 
sellers. 
However,  the most plausible ground for excluding punitive damages from 
contract liability, and the one that needs most argument to counter it, is that derived 
from efficient breach theory. It is limpidly summed up by Richard Posner. Suppose a 
manufacturer agrees to sell widgets to A. If, by breaching his contract with A and 
selling to B instead, he can make enough to compensate A for her loss and still come 
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 331, 351; Klein & Bachechi, Precontractual liability and the duty of  
good faith negotiation in international transactions, 17 Hous. J. Int'l L 1, 17 (1994).
69 See the authorities referred to in Note 19 above.
70 I ignore arguments which, while addressed to contractual awards, are really attacks on the idea of 
punitive damages per se. A good example is Swan, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A 
Remedy in Search of a Justification (2004) 29 Queen's L.J. 596. The invective here is directed 
specifically at the Canadian Supreme Court's acceptance of punitive damages in the insurance bad faith 
context in Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., (2002) 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257: but, as the author candidly admits, 
most of the points he makes are effectively arguments against the whole idea of punitives.
71 An argument accepted, for instance, by the English Law Commission as justifying wholesale 
exclusion of contract punitives: see its Report No 247, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary 
Damages (1997), § 5.72.
out ahead, he should do so. The manufacturer is better off, A is no worse off, and the 
widgets end up with B, who values them most. However deliberate or shocking the 
manufacturer’s  breach,  if  we mulct  him for  extra  damages  we will  likely  "deter 
efficient ... breaches, by making the cost of the breach to the contract breaker greater 
than  the  cost  of  the  breach  to  the  victim."  72 This  argument  has  an  instinctive 
plausibility and, no doubt for that reason, has since become pretty mainstream  73. 
Nevertheless, it faces at least two major difficulties. 
First,  there is the obvious point that not all breaches of contract are efficient, 
even if the breaching party compensates the victim in full 74. The widget example, for 
all its algebraic elegance (and its familiarity to law students and teachers alike), is 
atypical. It is much less clear how efficient breach applies to many of the contract 
breach cases we find in the real world: the car dealership from hell, the lawyer guilty 
of outrageous malpractice by subordinating the interest of one client to another, or 
the dishonest seller of a business who then opens up a competing outlet two doors 
away. Here, it is hard to see that anyone could seriously argue that there can be net 
social gains from the defendant’s breach. Indeed, even Posner himself accepts a form 
of this point: he candidly admits that his arguments do not apply to at least some 
breaches,  namely  those  that  are  opportunistic  and  merely  filch  value  from  a 
deserving to an undeserving party to the same contract 75. And even with the widgets, 
the efficient breach theory is only a starting-point. When other costs associated with 
disruption, seeking alternative sources of supply, and so on are in account, this fast 
chips away at the efficiency of the breach, despite the neat figures we have become 
used to reading 76. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that the mere fact that a breach is efficient should 
necessarily preclude a punitive award anyway. As I observed above, deterrence is 
arguably not the only permissible aim of punitive damages: other objects, such as the 
need to express the disapproval of the court or to buttress public attitudes to anti-
social behavior, may well be equally justifiable. Suppose a lawyer knowingly omits 
to represent his client’s interests because another is prepared to pay more for his 
time: or a home inspection company purposely skimps on an inspection because it 
has better paying clients elsewhere. Even if this does effectively transfer a resource 
to  a  person  who  values  it  more  than  the  other  contracting  party,  this  is  not  an 
attractive ground for exempting him from penal liability as a matter of principle 77.
72 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 1998), p.142. 
73 Farnsworth adopted it in Farnsworth, Contracts, § 12.3, at 157 (2d ed. 1998) ("Punitive damages 
should not be awarded for breach of contract because they will encourage performance when breach 
would be socially more desirable."). It has also proved popular judicially (examples being Thyssen, 
Inc. v. SS Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) and Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 
774 (Mont. 1990), and see too Judge Posner himself in Patton v. Md. Continent Systems, 841 F.2d 742 
(7th Cir. 1988). For good measure the Law Commission in England also accepted efficient breach as a 
reason for recommending that punitives not be available for breach of contract at all: see Report No 
247, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (1997), § 5.72.
74 Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Leg. St. 1.
75 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 1998), p.142. This qualification has been fairly widely 
accepted: e.g. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at All, Should It Be 
Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 425, 443-46 (1981); Perlstein, Crossing 
the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the Imposition of Extracompensatory 
Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 877, 879-90 (1992);Cohen, 
Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1291, 1302, 1309-10 (1985). 
76 See the remarks in Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 7 (1989) and 
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 Va. L. Rev. 947, 951-53 (1982); also the 
sour but perceptive remark of a Montana judge that efficient breaches are rarely efficient in fact (Story 
v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 774 (Mont. 1990)).
77 See Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629 (1999).
II. When should breaches of contract should be penalized?
So far I have argued that there is nothing about contract claims that justifies a rule − 
even a prima facie rule − ousting punitive awards. If this is right, the question comes 
down  to  this:  assuming  breaches  of  contract  can  attract  punitives,  which  ones 
should? We can, I suggest, set aside one extreme position occasionally advanced: 
that is, that there is no reason not to penalize all breaches of contract, or at least all 
deliberate ones, on the basis that where such rights have been infringed corrective 
justice demands that the infringer give up any advantage gained as a result  78. To 
begin with, this view logically applies to noncontractual causes of action as much as 
to contractual ones, and few if any would argue that all torts (or even all deliberate 
torts) should engender penal remedies as a matter of course. And in any case to say 
that the advantage gained from an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights should be 
returned to the plaintiff is not so much an argument for punitive damages (which 
presumably would have to exceed those gains in order to be effective) rather than an 
argument for an extension of the law of unjust enrichment.
With this out of the way, the proper starting-point, it is suggested, follows 
from what we have already argued. If there is no bright line between contract and 
tort claims, and no reason to exclude punitives from contract claims as such, then the 
default  position  should  be  that  the  same criteria  should  be  applied  to  breach  of 
contract suits as to tortious ones. These criteria will obviously vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction: but generally in tort punitives are a possibility where the defendant’s 
conduct is oppressive,  fraudulent or outrageous  79:  that  is,  where he has acted in 
willful or reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights, or where his conduct exhibited some 
"evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others,"  80 and their award is 
necessary to punish the defendant and to deter him and others from doing the same 
thing in future 81. American courts are more skeptical as to whether conduct falling 
short of intentional wrongdoing − crass or reckless negligence and the like − should 
attract punitive damages in tort 82. But in as far as it does, then it should equally do so 
78 See, e.g., Mather, Searching for the moral foundations of contract law, 47 Am. J. Juris. 71 (2002).
79 Restatement 2d of Torts, § 908(1).
80 E.g., Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1989). Conduct short of intentional wrongdoing 
may be sufficient to justify punitive damages in some jurisdictions. Courts use a variety of formulas to 
spell this out, including "reckless disregard for the rights of others," (Allman v. Bird, 353 P.2d 216 
(Kan. 1960); or "willful misconduct, wantonness, recklessness, or want of care indicative of 
indifference to consequences," In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878, 102 S. Ct. 358 (1981). Conduct that is merely negligent, even if it causes 
severe damage, is insufficient to justify punitive damages. This is usually held to be true of "grossly 
negligent" conduct when those terms are used as a synonym for "extreme carelessness" as opposed to 
"recklessness." Compare Moore v. Wilson, 20 S.W.2d 310 (Ark. 1929), with Williamson v. McKenna, 
354 P.2d 56 (Or. 1960), suspersed by statute as stated in Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984).
81 Restatement 2d of Torts, § 908, comment a; Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 
U.S. 424, 432 (2001)
82 In most states it does not, but there are exceptions. See Blatt et al., Punitive Damages, A State by 
State Guide to Law and Practice, § 3.2 (1991 & Supp. 1993); Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot 
Zones, 56 La. L. Rev. 781, 789 (1996); Prosser & Keeton, Torts, 5th ed, 1984, § 2. The Restatement 2d 
of Torts, § 908, is to similar effect, demanding conduct that is “outrageous, because of the defendant’s 
evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” The English Law Commission seems to 
agree, demanding a “deliberate and outrageous disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.”: Law Commission 
Report No 247, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (1997), Draft Bill, s.3(6). But the 
position in other common law jurisdictions seems to be in favor of the possibility: e.g. Lamb v Cotogno 
(1987) 164 C.L.R. 1 (Australia), Robitaille v Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd (1981) 124 D.L.R. (4th) 228 
(Canada), and more recently A v Bottrill [2003] A.C. 449 (New Zealand). 
in contract. Indeed, there is much to be said for equiparating, say, a gross malpractice 
claim 83 with a claim for very serious product liability negligence.
Does it follow from all this that − contrary to most lawyers’ intuition, both in 
the  US  and  elsewhere  − punitive  damages  ought  to  be  given  as  generously  in 
contract  cases  as  in  tortious  ones?  Interestingly  enough,  I  would  suggest  that  in 
practice the answer is no, and that the effect of my recommendations is likely to be 
less marked than one might think. This is for two reasons. One lies in the inherent 
nature of contractual claims. The other arises from a suggestion I make below that 
the assimilation of contract to noncontract claims should be merely a default rule, 
applicable only in the absence of compelling arguments to the contrary: I will in factl 
argue that there is one case where, exceptionally, punitive damages for breach of 
contract should be excluded.
To begin with the first of these points, my suggestion is that, in the nature of 
things, it will often be more difficult in practice to demonstrate in a contract suit the 
necessary degree of outrageousness or reprehensibility, and with it the need to punish 
or deter the defendant. 
Why? The first reason relates to a point is a fact already mentioned: namely, 
that breach of contract normally affects only the interests of the other parties to it, 
whereas a tort as often as not affects a much wider class. It is true (as I argued above) 
that the word “normally” matters: this is not invariably so and hence it is not an 
excuse  to  exclude  contracts  as  a  whole  from  the  punitive  damages  regime. 
Nevertheless  it  remains  the  case  that  the  number  of  persons  affected  by  the 
defendant’s wrong is a highly relevant factor: as courts and others have observed, the 
fact that the defendant’s wrong was likely to have widespread effects is a strong 
indication in favor of making a penal award 84. The converse also follows: the fewer 
people affected, the less appropriate punitive damages become. 
Another important consideration is the type of damage involved. Of course 
some breaches of contract involve the creation of risks of personal injury or very 
serious property damage; nevertheless, torts are in the nature of things rather more 
likely to give rise to such risks. There is no doubt that the existence of risks of this 
sort is a powerful argument for punitive damages, since there is obviously a strong 
social interest in discouraging such behavior, and the creation of a danger to life is 
inherently  more  reprehensible  than  subjecting  others  to  risks  of  mere  economic 
losses  85. By contrast, where there are no such risks, supercompensation is to that 
extent less justified 86. 
Furthermore,  there  is  an  interesting  empirical  distinction  between  typical 
cases  of  deliberate  torts  and  knowing  breaches  of  contract.  Knowingly  tortious 
behavior, or the commission of a tort comporting reckless disregard for the rights of 
others,  is  normally  something  for  which  it  is  difficult  to  find  any  convincing 
justification. An auto dealership will find it hard on any pretext to justify a habit of 
83 As in Bowman v Doherty, 686 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984) (repeated failure of attorney to appear for 
criminal client). See too the surveyor’s negligence case of A.B.C. Home & Real Estate Inspection, Inc.  
v. Plummer, 500 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind 1986).
84 E.g., see Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 453 P.2d 551, 557 (Id 1969) (punitive damages amply justified 
because of disregard of rights “not only of respondent … but the consuming public generally.” This is 
also the thrust of Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive damages: an economic analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869 
(1998), arguing that punitive damages are justified precisely because there are likely to be some 
victims who will not sue or recover. 
85 See, e.g., Schlueter & Redden, Punitive Damages (3d ed. 1995), p.536. A few cases have made the 
distinction: e.g. Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc., 60 F.3d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) ("In 
determining the reasonableness of an award of punitive damages, courts should consider whether ... the 
misconduct caused personal injury or merely damage to property ....")
86 And note that, even where punitives are awarded, an increased degree of danger to life and property 
justifies a higher award: BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1599 (1996).
lying to its customers; the same goes for the marketer of products showing reckless 
disregard as to whether they are likely to kill people, and to a large number of other 
tort defendants. On the other hand, the equities arising from breaches of contract, 
even deliberate ones, are a good deal less clear-cut. True, some such breaches are 
inexcusable on any normal reckoning. The seller of a business who contracts not to 
compete and then immediately and cynically poaches the buyer’s entire customer 
base,  and  the  crassly  malpractising  lawyer,  are  unsympathetic  characters  on  any 
account.  But most breach of contract  is more nuanced: contracts are deliberately 
broken for all sorts of reasons, and with very varying degrees of culpability 87. The 
interpretation of a contract may, for example, raise issues as to whether there is a 
breach  at  all,  something  that  is  not  often  in  issue  in  a  deliberate  tort.  Again,  a 
contractor may be suffering from cash-flow or organizational problems, or shortages 
of labor or materials,  that  make it impossible for him to fulfill  his obligations to 
some or all of his clients. In such cases, the breach may be deliberate (the defendant, 
after all, made a choice not to risk his solvency, or to perform his contract with X 
rather  than  Y,  and  he  could have  chosen  differently  had  he  been  so  inclined). 
Nevertheless, in cases like these, where the choice to breach was, to say the least, 
constrained,  the  defendant’s  wrong  is  unlikely  to  be  regarded  as  outrageous  or 
reprehensible or a suitable subject for punitive damages. 
Moreover, there is another point to remember about efficient breach. Despite 
the criticisms that  can  be  advanced against  the theory  as  a  reason not  to  award 
punitive damages, it is pretty clear that if it does apply, it is more likely to do so in a 
contract than a tort suit. Although some deliberate torts are clearly susceptible to an 
efficient breach analysis (nuisance is an obvious example 88, and there are no doubt 
others  89), in the majority of cases deliberate torts are likely to be either inefficient 
per  se,  or  opportunistic  and  thus  outside  the  normal  ambit  of  efficient  breach 
anyway. In short, it remains true that it is easier to break a contractual than a tortious 
duty efficiently. 
Now, the arguments just advanced go a good way toward calming fears of an 
explosion in contractual punitive damages suits even if, as I have argued, breaches of 
contract ought on principle to be treated the same way as torts. Many undeserving 
breach of contract  plaintiffs  will  find themselves naturally,  and rightly,  excluded 
from a place at the punitive damages trough. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that 
these considerations may not go quite far enough. The difficulties arise in particular 
in connection with typical commercial contracts. Here it has been argued, with some 
justification, that we should be wary of introducing punitive considerations: even if 
we do not wish to exclude them entirely, there is in most cases no reason to go 
beyond ordinary compensatory damages or to investigate the motives for breach 90. 
87 See Pennington, Punitive Damages For Breach of Contract: A Core Sample From The Last Ten 
Years, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 31, 40 (1989). See too the interesting discussion, in the insurance context, in 
Capozzola, First-Party Bad Faith: The Search for a Uniform Standard of Culpability, 52 Hastings L. J. 
181, 196 (2000); and more generally Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 Va. L. Rev. 
1225 (1994).
88 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972) and the subsequent literature it has spawned. 
89 Including, perhaps, even conversion − at least on occasion. Suppose A, having agreed to supply B 
with a widget, finds that C is prepared to pay more for it, then all other things being equal A should sell 
it to C and leave B to her remedy in damages. It should clearly make no difference in this respect that 
ownership happens to have passed to B and hence A is technically liable in conversion as well as for 
breach of contract. 
90 A number of cases have made this point. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard 
Oil Co. of California., 129 Cal. App. 3d 416 (1982) (affirmed in part and reversed in part, 686 P.2d 
1158 (1984)); see also Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385 
(9th Cir. 1983) (applying California law). 
Assume, for example, that a ship charterer breaks a charter for no reason other than 
that it is extremely unprofitable to it and it has a better use for its money (or for that 
matter that commercial relations have simply broken down); or conversely that a 
shipowner deliberately withdraws a ship half-way through a charter because it has 
another charterer prepared to pay a great deal more for it. Or imagine that a major 
bank, in breach of contract and with no other plausible excuse, withdraws from a 
syndicated loan agreement. The idea that conduct of this sort should engender claims 
for punitives as well as compensatory damages seems instinctively odd. But why? Of 
course in  some such cases  the question is  straightforward on the  arguments  just 
advanced. For example, in a commercial as in a noncommercial contract, a defendant 
who fails to perform because of genuine cashflow difficulties is hardly deserving of 
punishment. Again, in a number of commercial situations there may be an argument 
based on efficient breach. The withdrawal of a ship under charter to take account of a 
better offer is simply the widget case writ large: all other things being equal, the 
resource (use of the ship) should be allowed to end up in the hands of the party that 
values it most. But this will not always be the case. Are there any other grounds for 
limiting  punitive  relief?  Or,  to  put  the question more  bluntly,  should  there  be  a 
general “commercial contract exemption?”
This is certainly an intuitive idea, and one with some support: witness not 
infrequent suggestions that punitives in contract cases should be limited to contracts 
where there is some inequality, or dependence relationship, between the parties  91. 
One can see the attraction of this view: if overreaching is a factor in favor of making 
a punitive award available, this ties in not only with a willingness to give punitive 
damages for analogous wrongs such as breach of fiduciary duty 92, but also with the 
idea that punitives ought to protect the relatively powerless rather than those able to 
look after  themselves  93.  But  a  blanket  “commercial  contract”  limitation  may be 
going too far. For example, take an egregious and deliberate breach of a construction 
contract between two medium-sized businesses, or a case where a bank deliberately 
withdraws funding facilities from a borrower in plain breach of contract and with no 
other plausible excuse. Or, for that matter, consider particularly gross malpractice by 
a law firm causing serious loss to a large client. There seems no reason why even 
large businesses should be denied the sanction of punitive damages on principle in 
such a case. On the contrary: many of the traditional arguments for punitives − such 
as the need to discourage such behavior and to protect the ethics of the marketplace − 
continue to apply. 
In situations of this sort there is, I suggest, room for a more sophisticated 
idea, which I put forward here in outline. Punitive awards should be denied in breach 
of  contract  cases,  even  where  the  breach  is  entirely  deliberate,  self-serving  and 
unjustified, on one condition. This is that the defendant should be able to show that 
the act amounting to breach is one that, but for the fact that it infringed the plaintiff’s 
rights,  could  be  regarded  as  a  reasonable  business  decision  taken  in  good faith. 
91 E.g., Louderback & Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 187, 189 (1982).
92 Supra, Note 17.
93 See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, The historical continuity of punitive damages awards: reforming the tort  
reformers, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 1269, 1332 (1993) (“The use of punitive damages by powerful 
corporations against their rivals is inconsistent with the traditional functions of the remedy …. Just as 
commercial law provides consumers with special protections that are not available to commercial 
concerns, it might be appropriate to limit punitive damages availability to relatively powerless 
individuals and entities.”). Cf too Bridgeman, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for 
Punitive Damages? 56 Vand. L. Rev. 237, 263 (2003), arguing that “sophisticated promisees should by 
now be on notice that in general promisors can breach freely and willfully as long as they pay 
expectation damages.”
Effectively  this  is  sufficient  to  eliminate  the  specter  of  courts  examining  the 
circumstances  of  most  ordinary  breaches  of  commercial  contracts,  such  as  ship 
charters, distribution agreements and commodity supply contracts. The mere fact that 
a breach was self-serving and intended to increase the defendant’s profits, or that it 
resulted from the defendant’s desire to sever relations with the plaintiff, would thus 
be irrelevant. So also would be the knowledge that the breach might have disastrous 
consequences for the plaintiff’s own business. In all these cases, there is a sensible 
commercial rationale for what the defendant did, even though in acting as it did it 
may have infringed the plaintiff’s rights. In denying punitives in cases of this sort, 
we  serve  the  important  commercial  interest  that,  when  contracting,  a  contractor 
should be able  to  predict  the “exit  price” from the contractual  obligation he has 
undertaken 94. But where some other factor is present, such as a desire to harm the 
plaintiff  without  particularly  benefiting  himself  or  serving  his  own  legitimate 
business interests, or a desire unfairly to further the interests of some third party or 
competitor of the plaintiff  95, then the defendant’s interest in foreseeing how much 
breach  will  cost  becomes  a  great  deal  less  defensible.  The  need  to  allow  the 
defendant to exercise commercial judgement without the fear of open-ended liability 
in  damages  does  not  extend  to  decisions  which  serve  no  legitimate  business  or 
commercial end. protect the maker of commercial is virtually non-existent. 
This solution also has a further advantage. The reasoning behind it can be 
extended to justify preserving the possibility of contractual punitive damages not 
only  for  deliberate  and  unjustifiable  breaches,  but  also  for  egregious  or  gross 
negligence (for example, in professional malpractice claims brought by commercial 
entities). It is one thing to say − correctly − that malpractice liability is a risk run by 
any lawyer or accountant, and that the measure of any potential liability should thus 
be  reasonably  predictable.  But  this  reasoning  applies  much  less,  if  at  all,  to 
malpractice  of  such  an  outrageous  nature  that  a  court  considers  it  worthy  of 
punishment: this is not a normal business risk in respect of which there is a strong 
claim to protection. 
III. Conclusion
The conclusion of this piece can be fairly briefly summed up in four propositions. (1) 
There is  no justification for excluding punitive awards from contract damages as 
such. (2) On the contrary, breach of contract should generally be capable of giving 
rise to punitive damages on much the same basis as claims in tort. (3) In practice, a 
rule of this sort would, perhaps surprisingly, not give rise to an explosion in punitive 
claims against contract defendants. (4) Nevertheless, there is scope for one limitation 
in contract punitives, namely that a defendant should be able to escape them in so far 
as the breach amounted to a legitimate business decision independent of its wrongful 
nature.
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94 See Johnson, The Boundaries of Extracompensatory Relief for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 Conn. 
L. Rev. 181, 182 (2000).
95 For a straightforward example, see Pace & Sons, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 514 A.2d 766 
(Conn, 1986) (insurance company withdrew surety bond from contractor because, among other things, 
it was “going to get” contractor).
